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Abstract 
 
Tax evasion is a much discussed topic in modern finance with some scandals 
involving well-known firms. Also we know that tax has a great impact in the money 
collected by government and so the economy and GDP of each country is much affected 
by taxes. The capability to understand the dynamics of tax evasion and to control tax 
evasion by the governments can have huge impact in the economy. 
We observe that firms have the perception that the context of a country will 
incentivize them to engage in tax evasion. We studied the dynamics behind tax evasion 
on firms, finding a gap in literature involving this tax evasion on firms and linking that 
gap with a real options approach. 
We used a real options model with two different stages in order to incorporate 
several variables that influence the incentives of firms to tax evasion and we also 
incorporate uncertainty in our model. We reach a critical value for which a firm is 
incentivized to enter the stage of tax evasion and we make some important conclusions 
about the dynamics of tax evasion. 
Key-words: Real options; Tax evasion. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“When there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on 
the same amount of income” – Plato, The Republic, Book I, 343-D 
In this dissertation we try to fill the gap between tax evasion related to firms. 
Despite the several previous works about tax evasion most of them do not refer the 
importance of this possibility in firms’ decisions. Using a real options approach we 
developed a model that tries to reach a value where a company is incentivized to hide 
some profits in order to pay fewer taxes. These real options model incorporates several 
variables that influence the decision of the firm to tax evade like level of cash flows of 
the firm at the moment, the tax rate of the country, the penalty paid to authorities in case 
of being caught and the probability of being caught by fiscal authorities or efficiency of 
fiscal authorities. The uncertainty of cash flows is also incorporated in our real options 
model, so that way our model is applicable in cases where the cash flows are totally 
certain or part of them is not.  
The main aim of this dissertation is to investigate the main drivers of tax evasion 
by firms. With the model that we developed we were able to anticipate the values for 
which a company will have incentives to hide some profits by hiding sales or declaring 
more costs than they had in reality. With comparative analysis we also could see the 
effects of changing some variables in the critical value for which the manager of the 
firm would decide to hide profits.  
 Tax evasion is a practice where individuals or firms tend to intentionally pay 
fewer taxes than they should, these practice is illegal and there are many ways to do it. 
Individuals or firms can reduce their tax obligations by underreporting incomes, 
overstating costs, deductions or credits, by failing to file appropriate tax returns or even 
by engaging in barter to avoid taxes. These actions can be taken both by individuals or 
firms in different ways but with the same objective of reducing the level of taxes to be 
paid. Tax avoidance is sometimes assumed as the same thing as tax evasion but it is not. 
Tax avoidance is legal and the use of legal means to have tax benefits or lower the tax 
obligations by the use of deductions, subsidies or credits.  
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 The financial and fiscal crisis along with the fiscal consolidations that some 
countries took part of, brought some themes to discussion about the macroeconomic 
problems in the society. However, tax evasion and corruption were not seen as a big 
issue for the economic growth of countries. For example, recent studies in Spain and 
Greece showed that tax evasion and corruption increased on those two countries that 
adopted consolidation policies to improve their economy. The technical staff of Spanish 
Finance Ministry
1
 indicated that shadow economy increased 6.8 p.p between 2008 and 
2012, reaching 24,6% of GDP, for example.  
In figure 1, we can see how the impact of shadow economy in Europe. We can see 
that there are some countries where the shadow economy is above 20% of GDP, so this 
can have a great impact in the economy of a country.  In Figure 2 we can see the control 
of corruption in Europe measured in an Index. Also we can see how corruption affects 
the economy of countries. Those figures show us how the shadow economy and 
corruption can influence the economy of a country and distort the incoming of an 
economy. 
 
                                                          
1
 http://www.gestha.es/archivos/actualidad/2014/2014-01-29_InformePrensa_EconomiaSumergida.pdf 
Figure 1 - Shadow Economy in Europe. 
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 Two greek authors also referred the impact of tax evasion in greek recent crisis, 
they mentioned that the lack of capability of governments to provide public goods with 
the quality expected according to the level of taxes created a “legitimization” of tax 
evasion. During the last decades there have been lots of scandals involving big 
companies and tax evasion or corruption.  
 Along with the effect of the tax evasion the scandals involving tax evasion and 
tax avoidance have raised many questions in public opinion and lots of investigations 
were opened against some firms. One example of that is the FBI investigation 
concerning UBS switzerland bank. In that case the bank offered their clients offshore 
financial vehicles in order to evade taxes. The swiss bank was investigated in three 
diferent countries, Germany, Belgium and France, and already had to pay a penalty. 
Several authors tend to agree that more than financial penalties, moral costs are 
very important to punish a firm or individual that choose to tax evade. Some studies 
demonstrated that with the same level of taxes and policies, different countries have 
different levels of tax evasion and the reason pointed out was those moral and 
reputation costs. Despite that ,financial penalties and policies to increase the probability 
of caught tax evaders are important and can reduce the tax evasion level. 
Figure 2 - Control of Corruption Index in Europe. 
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Using a theme that generates much discussion and having found a gap in 
literature, we for the first time, developed a real options model to try to understand the 
dynamics of tax evasion. Linking real options with tax evasion brought us interesting 
results about how firms react to different inputs and the expected actions that they could 
take. Our model finds a critical value where the firm, at some moment and some level 
of cash flows, will have incentives to understate profits and pay fewer taxes. We study 
the possibility of having different values for multiple variables to explore the 
possibilities for the firm and see the reaction on the trigger value.  
We find that the higher the corporate tax rate, the most a firm will have 
incentives to tax evade. This is intuitive but with this model we were able to extract 
some analitical proof of this. As higher the corporate tax rate, the firm will have to pay 
more to government and that way will have less profits. If the firm has the option to 
understate profits in someway in order to pay fewer taxes, this part of undeclared profits 
that will not be taxed will result in a gain for the firm. Also we find out that the more  
the possibility of understating profits, the sooner a company will have incentives to 
enter the tax evasion stage. These results of our model confirmed our intuition about 
this, if a firm has more chance to understating profits they will have higher gains from 
this activity so they will have bigger incentive to enter this stage. The level of penalty 
and the probability of being caught or efficiency of fiscal authority are inversely related 
with the trigger value which means that the higher these two variables, the later a firm 
will have incentives to tax evasion. These were the expected results because if the fiscal 
authority is more efficient the firms that choose to tax evade will face higher probability 
of being discovered and have to pay a penalty along with the moral damage that this 
will represent for the company. In the same way if the penalty is high enough the firm 
will have less incentives to enter the tax evasion stage once if the fiscal authorities 
detect the ilegal activity, the firm will have to pay more to government. One of the most 
interesteing results was the relation between volatility of cash flows and the trigger 
value, has higher the volatility is the later a firm will have incentives to tax evade. From 
our perspective, this makes sense because if a manager could not antecipate with 
assurance the level of cash flows it will be harder to make a proper decision about enter 
the stage where the firm is tax evading. 
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The dissertation is divided in four more chapters. In the next we present the 
literature review for the topic, then we move for the setup of the model and the 
comparative statistics. We finish with a numerical example of our model and the 
conclusions of the dissertation. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
In 1973, Black and Scholes (1973) have developed a model for valuing both call 
and put options. They concluded that markets did not reflect the prices predicted by the 
formula. Until today, this formula is still used to value financial options as well as real 
options. The term real option was first introduced by Stewart C Myers (1977). This 
author in his paper compared some assets with call options. The author pointed out 
some problems with simple models to value corporate borrowing like the one from 
MM, because they didn’t account with the difference between assets in place and future 
investments.  They draw some conclusions like uncertainty is greater with future 
opportunities, future opportunities can only be available if present investments are made 
and to have the option in future investments sometimes there is a need to pay more. 
Also the same author stated that financial theory has been wrong or misapplied in some 
situations. DCF model is similar to NPV rule and has been used to value growth 
opportunities with options, abandoning options “out of the money” that needed to be 
paid to keep or exercising options in wrong timings.  
Real options approach should be used to value some growth opportunities that 
include options, because this approach includes the flexibility on the investment 
opportunity. (Stewart C. Myers, 1984). Also Trigeorgis (1996) referred the importance 
of using real options to incorporate flexibility in capital budgeting. The author says that 
real investments can be viewed as multiple options that interact with competitiveness 
and strategy. McDonald and Siegel (1986) studied the optimal timing to invest in a 
project with irreversible costs and where cash flows and investments costs follow a 
continuous-time stochastic process (gBm process). They concluded that can be valuable 
to wait until a certain trigger and invest when the cash flows are twice the investment 
costs, this would be the optimal timing to invest. “Investment under Uncertainty” 
brought a deeper look to options approach including irreversibility, flexibility and 
uncertainty in investment decisions. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), developed in this book 
many models with different variables where they explain the importance of real options 
to value projects. So, the investor should evaluate the possibility of alternative outcomes 
regarding the outcome that he is expecting and assess the optimal timing to invest.  
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 Slemrod (2007) wrote a paper where he talks about the presence of tax evasion 
since the Romans. He also refers to Baumeister (1982) when he stated the vulnerability 
of self-reports to underreporting. In their paper Tanzi and Shome (1993) referred the 
universality of tax evasion. The tax gap was ignored in many countries but the 
governments of several countries are more concerned in reducing tax evasion instead of 
raising tax rates. Tax evasion could be practiced in different forms like: not declaration 
of income, under or overreporting of income or costs, smuggle goods or assets and 
others, as the authors refer. Hines Jr and Rice (1990) developed a paper where they 
explore the possibility of large US corporations use tax havens to shift their profits and 
pay lower taxes. This leads to a lower tax collection by the US as the companies choose 
to reallocate some of the profits to other countries.  
 
Sandmo (2005) gives us an insight about the history of tax evasion. He considers 
that tax evasion first become to be studied in 1974 by Allingham and Sandmo. The 
author differentiates tax evasion and tax avoidance. Tax evasion is a violation of the 
law, but tax avoidance is within the legal framework of the law. In tax evasion the firm 
or individual have to be worried about being detected but in tax avoidance it was only 
explored a loophole in tax law in order to pay less tax. In his conclusions, Sandmo 
referred that under the conclusion of the paper of Becker (1974) the government should 
choose low probabilities of detection and high penalties. This way the costs of tax 
administration are lower. The author concludes saying that tax evasion decision is 
dependent on the behavior of others, as more socially acceptable the tax evasion the 
more tax evasion the society will have. He also states that tax evasion is not an 
argument for lower marginal tax rate as the penalty and audit rate are more linked with 
the decision of tax evasion. In an extreme interpretation of this theory the penalties 
should be so high that the tax evader goes bankruptcy and the cost of administration 
would be zero, as the probability of being caught.  
 
Mossin (1968) and Stiglitz (1969) were the first to refer the effect of taxes on 
individual consumer’s choice of portfolio, however they forget about tax evasion as an 
option. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) incorporated in their paper the possibility of 
deliberated underreporting in order to avoid taxes. They relate their paper with criminal 
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activity of tax evasion but also related with analysis of optimal portfolio in economics 
of uncertainty. In Allingham and Sandmo’s model the evaded tax would lead to a 
penalty to be paid if the authorities caught the tax evasion. These authors developed a 
model for an individual to choose between tax evade or not. The objective will be the 
maximization of the income and the individual will face a probability of being caught 
by authorities and will have to pay a penalty at the undeclared amount. In this case the 
punishment is to pay the undeclared amount at higher rate than the corporate tax rate of 
the country. This is a simplification of the penalty in real word, once in the real world 
there is a moral hazard of being caught in an illegal activity like tax evasion and 
probably the court will decide the penalty. In other words, it is difficult to preview the 
penalty to be applied in each case once there is much uncertainty about that, so the 
authors choose to simplify it. 
 
As Allingham and Sandmo (1972) were more concerned with direct taxes, 
Marrelli (1984) developed a model related with indirect taxes. He studied the decision 
of entrepreneur to under-reporting indirect taxes, limiting the model to monopolistic 
firm. In this case there is a connection between the production and the evasion of taxes. 
They refer important conclusions: higher tax rates due not lead to higher declarations 
(Yitzhaki, 1974), they “compare direct versus indirect tax evasion and we show that, for 
decreasing risk aversion, and indirect tax is evaded as a percentage less than a profit tax 
of equal yield” and they also state that shifting and tax evasion decisions are 
independent from each other. As Marrelli (1984) developed a model linking tax evasion 
with under-reporting of sales taxes, there is also the possibility of over reporting of 
actual costs.  
 
Wang and Conant (1988) developed a model with the possibility of over reporting 
the actual production costs. They concluded that the decision of tax evade and 
production are separable, as concluded previously by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
and Marrelli (1984). The level of tax evasion, on other hand, is related to the variations 
in tax rate, the penalty rate and probability of detection. The underreporting of actual 
wage payments was studied by Yaniv (1988). Lin and Yang (2001) developed a 
dynamic model for tax evasion and they concluded that higher tax rates encourage the 
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tax evasion in this case of a dynamic setting. This conclusion is highly intuitive and was 
expressed in a report by the Economist (May 28, 1994)  where the publication refers 
that lowering tax rates can lower tax evasion. Also several other authors have tried to 
build theoretical models to support this theory.  
 
  Yaniv (1995) proposed a general model of tax evasion applicable to any type of 
tax and to any type of evasion, such as under reporting or over reporting. The author 
assumes that firm wants to maximize their profits. The firm considers the possibility of 
tax evading part of the total profits, if the firm is detected they have to pay the evaded 
tax and a penalty that is a multiple. In this paper the author also states the separability 
between firm production decision and the tax evasion. Panteghini (2000) developed a 
model that relates tax evasion and flexibility. The author develops a dynamic model 
characterized by discrete time, risk neutrality and nonzero investment. He includes the 
effect of “bad news” that represents auditory for tax evading firms. Using real options 
theory he provides a payoff that incorporates the option to delay the investment. 
Following Yitzhaki (1974) the penalty is proportional to the tax evaded, given a 
probability of detection. The author concludes that if an irreversible investment is 
introduced the decision of investment and production cannot be separated from tax 
evasion.  
 
 In the literature we can observe that tax evasion is more discussed in an 
individual perspective and not in a firm perspective. Most of the papers are about tax 
evasion on individuals and not companies. Besides that none of the previous authors 
used a dynamic setting for study tax evasion, i.e., seeing real options has an option. Our 
model has the capability of study tax evasion on firms while links real options with that. 
That way we are able to treat tax evasion has an options for the firms and study the 
impact of having that option for the firm with different perspectives that the firms has 
about the market.   
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3. The model 
 
In this chapter we develop a real options model in order to understand the dynamics 
of tax evasion. For that purpose we consider two different stages or periods. One where 
the firm declares all the profits, having the option to modify its behavior. And a second 
one where the firm is active in tax evasion.  
To solve this problem and find the solution to our model we use a backwards 
procedure standing from the second stage.  
 
3.1. Setup 
 
In a world where taxes are so high, firms have some incentives to tax evade. 
Managers have the option to understate some profit flows in order to pay fewer taxes 
and with that have more profits. As usual, we consider that firms want to maximize their 
profit so it is rational to understate some profits in order to pay fewer taxes. As we 
referred above, there are two periods in this model. In one period the firm is tax evading 
and in the other is not. Once a firm decides to tax evade it will be forever until the state 
discovers it and punishes the firm. This punishment is a defined constant for a question 
of simplification of the model.  
The profit flows of the firm are represented by π and they follow a geometric 
Brownian motion (gBm), the standard approach defined by Dixit and Pindyck (1994).  
                    (3.1) 
where π > 0,    is the increment of the Wiener process,   is the instantaneous 
conditional expected relative change in π, also known as the drift.       (r >  ), 
where r is the risk-free rate and    (>0) corresponds to the opportunity cost of deferring 
and   is the instantaneous conditional standard deviation.  
As mentioned before there are two periods in this model, one with tax evasion 
and other with no tax evasion. We start by assuming that the company is tax evading 
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and we use a backwards methodology to reach the differential equation of the period 
with no tax evasion. 
Setting H(X) has the function where the firm is tax evading and it has no 
flexibility to go back, we reach the following ordinary differential equation (o.d.e): 
  
 
                                             
  (
       
   
        )    
 
(3.2) 
  As mentioned before   is the profit flow of the company.   is the tax rate paid by 
the company according to profit flows and   is the percentage of profit flows that are 
evaded by the firm. P represents the punishment when the company is caught by the 
government in tax evasion. For simplification, we consider that P is constant and it is a 
fixed amount. This simplification also makes sense because of prescription of fiscal 
crimes.   is the probability of the authorities to see that the firm is tax evading and 
punish the firm because of that. In other words, .  captures the efficiency of fiscal 
authorities to detect and punish the company’s tax evasion behavior. This efficiency is a 
perception that the firm has about it. 
 The equation 3.2 has three different terms. The first term              
captures the after tax profit that is currently being declared. As the firm do not declare 
all the profit flow, only the declared part is subject of the corporate tax rate. The second 
term    represents the not-taxed profit flow, in other words, this is the gain from not 
declaring all the profits by the firm. As this part of the profit is not subject to taxes, the 
gain will be total and not taxes will be retired from the profit flow. The third term 
 (
       
   
        ) is the expected damage of being caught by fiscal authorities. As 
we can observe, if the firm is caught will have to pay a penalty for its illegal behavior. 
Also it is assumed that once the firm is caught it will have to return to full declared 
profits and the no tax evasion stage.  
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The solution to this equation is: 
 
        
      
   
      
   
 
   
     
 
 
   
  (3.3) 
 
In this stage, we consider that there is no flexibility for the manager. There is no 
possibility of declaring all the profits now. The manager has no flexibility to regret his 
decision to tax evade because once the firm is tax evading it will be forever until it gets 
caught by fiscal authorities. As we assume this condition that the manager cannot go 
back and the firm stays in the stage of tax evasion, once the manager makes the decision 
of understate profits, we consider that there is no flexibility. Since there is no flexibility, 
       . We reach the following solution, following this assumption: 
 
     
      
   
 
   
     
 
 
   
  
 
(3.4) 
 Let us move now to the stage where the company declares all the profits but 
faces the change to engage in tax evasion activity.  
When the firm is not tax evading and keeps the option to change to a tax evasion 
model the ordinary differential equation (o.d.e.) is the following: 
  
 
                                  
 
(3.5) 
In this case the payoff is simple, it is the profit flow (   less the tax paid 
according to that profit.  
The general solution to the equation 3.5 is the following: 
 
 
        
      
   
      
   
 
 
 (3.6) 
 
13 
 
As    and    are constants and arbitrary. Also we know that: 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 √(
 
  
 
 
 
)
 
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
(3.7) 
 
    
 
 
 
 
  
 √(
 
  
 
 
 
)
 
   
 
  
  
 
 
(3.8) 
 
Beside that we know that       , once that if the profit flow is zero there will 
be no incentives to tax evasion. If a firm has no profits they will have no opportunity to 
have gains if they choose to engage in tax evasion activity. This is condition is known 
as absorption barrier. 
To reach the solution the three boundary conditions have to be respected as 
mentioned before, in this model period with no tax evasion the boundary conditions are 
the following: 
 
     
      
   
 
   
     
 
 
   
  
 
(3.9) 
 
      
     
   
 
  
     
 (3.10) 
 
The first condition is value matching condition. The second term from the right-
hand of the equation 3.6 that represents the extra profit made with the option to evade 
some profit flows. The company understates some profits in order to pay fewer taxes. 
As the company has to face the risk of the governments find out and make them pay a 
penalty, the second part captures efficiency of fiscal authority multiplied by the penalty. 
The second condition is smooth pasting condition which assures that the 
function is continuously differentiable along  . 
The value function of our model is defined as following and solution for our 
model is: 
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{
 
       
   
  
    
     
 
 
   
  (
 
  
)
 
         
      
   
 
   
     
 
 
   
           
 (3.6) 
 
The trigger is: 
 
   
 
   
     
  
 
   
  
 
(3.7) 
In the first branch we have the case where there is no incentive to tax evasion, 
the trigger is bigger than the profit flow. In the second branch is the opposite, the trigger 
is equal or smaller than the profit flow. In this case there is incentive to tax evade part of 
the profits. 
 
3.2. Comparative statics  
 
In this chapter we present a comparative statistics analysis in order to understand the 
impact of the main parameters on tax evasion dynamics. 
For that purpose we present the derivatives of the trigger value (  ) in order to three 
different variables and in figure 3, 4 and 5 we have the relation between the trigger and 
the different variables assuming the parameters referred in the figures legend. 
 
    
  
  
          
              
   
 
 
 
 
 
(3.8) 
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 Figure 3 - Sensitivity analysis on tax rate related with cash flows assuming 
the following parameters: π=100; r=0,04; σ=0,25; α=0.01;  =0.15;  =20; 
λ=0,10 
 
 
 
We find that the level of taxes (t) is negatively related with the trigger (   ). As 
higher (lower) the level of taxes, lower (higher) will be the trigger. In terms of 
economy, it makes sense. Because if the taxes are higher the firm has incentives to 
evade profits earlier than if the level of taxes is lower.  
 
    
  
 
                
              
   
 
(3.9) 
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Figure 4 - Sensitivity analysis on probability of being caught by authorities 
related with cash flows assuming the following parameters: π=100; r=0,04; 
σ=0,25; α=0.01;  =0.15;  =20; t=0,20. 
 
 
 
The derivative of    the in order to   is positive. We know that      
         are positive values, so the denominator is positive. In the numerator, we 
know that P is positive, r is always bigger than   and   is positive. We need to prove 
that              is also positive. In fact we can rearrange this expression to 
            . We know that     is always positive, so the expression is 
positive and it is proved that the signal of the derivative is positive. 
The probability of the authorities find out the fiscal evasion of the firm (   is 
positively related with the trigger value. The trigger value will increase (decrease) with 
the increase (decrease) of the probability of being caught. It is intuitive that if there is 
more risk the incentives to tax evasion will be lower because there is more probability 
of penalty, as the authorities find out the tax evasion.  
 
    
  
  
          
              
   
 
(3.10) 
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Figure 5 - Sensitivity analysis on level of understated cash flows related with cash 
flows assuming the following parameters: π=100; r=0,04; σ=0,25; α=0.01;  =20; 
t=0,20; λ=0,10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can also see that as higher (lower) the profit understated by the firm is, the 
lower (higher) is the trigger value. If a firm understates more profits it has more 
incentives to make tax evasion sooner that if they understate fewer profits. 
From this comparative statistics we can make several conclusions. We observe 
that the raising of corporate tax rate will lead to higher incentives to tax evasion by 
firms and sooner the companies will have incentives to understate profits. The relation 
between the level of understated profits and the trigger value is the same of corporate 
tax rate and the trigger value, it is a positive one. As more the firm has possibility of 
understating part of the profits and pay fewer taxes, the sooner the firm will have 
incentives to enter the stage where chooses to engage in tax evasion. The efficiency of 
fiscal authorities or the probability of being caught by fiscal authorities in a tax evasion 
stage will have the contrary effect on the trigger value. As higher the efficiency of fiscal 
authorities is the later the firm will have incentives to enter the stage of tax evasion and 
they will postpone their decision to engage in this activity. 
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4. Numerical Example 
 
Let us now present a numerical example. We assume that a firm has the 
possibility of evading some of the cash flows of the year. The manager has to make a 
decision whether he wants to evade or not with the risk of being caught and penalized or 
paying high taxes. If he decides to evade some profits he has to decide the percentage of 
cash flows to evade and how. We have several parameters to estimate the optimal 
timing for the manager to evade cash flows, assuming that the parameters have those 
values presented in the table 1 below. For the probability of being caught we use a low 
value as it is referred by the literature review. The penalty assumes a value constant as it 
was referred before and it is a proportional value to the cash flows evaded.  
 
Table 1 - Input variables for the numerical example. 
Parameter Description Value 
π Profit flow of the firm at moment 0 2000 M€ 
σ Cash flows volatility 25% 
r Risk-free Interest Rate 2% 
α Cash flow growth rate 1,5% 
t Tax rate 30,00% 
  Cash flows evaded 15% 
  Penalty paid to authorities 100 
λ Probability of being caught 10% 
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Based on the equations (3.12) and (3.13) we find the following output value: 
 
Table 2 - Output values for the numerical example. 
Output Description Value 
   Level of cash flows where is optimal to evade 2116 M€ 
    Cash flows evaded 317 M€ 
 
In Table 2 we have the value of the trigger that indicates the optimal timing 
where the manager is incentivized to evade some percentage of cash flows. In this case, 
the manager only has incentives to evade cash flows at a level of 2116 million euros. 
Assuming that the percentage evaded is 15%, the manager would evade 317 million 
euros. As we see the profit flows are at the moment zero, 2000 million euros, a value 
close to 2116. When the profit flow achieves a value bigger or equal to 2116 the 
manager will have incentives to evade. In the real world it is not mandatory to wait for 
the exact moment when the profit flows achieve 2116, a close value could be sufficient 
to incentive the manager to evade some cash flows.  
  
Table 3 - Sensitivity analysis of trigger values with different tax rates and probabilities 
of being caught. 
t 
 2116,029 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 
λ 
5% 1900 1425 1140 950 814 
8% 3055 2291 1833 1527 1309 
10% 4232 3174 2539 2116 1814 
15% 6615 4961 3969 3307 2835 
20% 9014 6760 5408 4507 3863 
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The table 3 above shows us the behavior of the trigger when the tax rate is 
higher or lower and the same for the probability of being caught. We can see that the 
increase of the probability of being caught increases the trigger value, what seems 
logical because if there is more chance of being caught the manager will postpone the 
tax evasion. On contrary, the increase of the tax rate leads to a decrease in the trigger 
because the company will have incentives to evade earlier when the taxes are too high.  
 
Table 4 - Sensitivity analysis of trigger values with different volatilities and penalty for 
being caught. 
P 
 2116,029 50 75 100 150 200 
σ 
15% 646 970 1293 1939 2585 
20% 829 1244 1659 2488 3318 
25% 1058 1587 2116 3174 4232 
30% 1333 1999 2665 3998 5331 
35% 1654 2481 3308 4963 6617 
 
In the table 4 we relate two more variables with the trigger. We see that the 
volatility, σ, is positively related with the trigger. In other words, when the volatility 
increases (decreases) the trigger also increases (decreases). So, when the volatility of 
the cash flows is higher the more the manager waits to evade cash flows. This could 
happen because if the cash flows are more volatile, the manager would not know if it is 
worth to evade some part of the cash flows, so he waits more time. The penalty has the 
same relation with the trigger, when the penalty increases (decreases) the trigger also 
increases (decreases). It is easy to understand that when the penalty for evading cash 
flows is higher manager waits more time to evade cash flows because the penalty will 
affect more the firm, so the cash flows evaded have to be bigger to be worth the risk of 
evading cash flows. 
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The highlighted values in the table correspond to values where the profit flow, 
2.000M€, is bigger than the trigger that we achieve with those inputs. In those cases the 
manager is incentivized to evade part of the cash flows.  
 
Figure 6 - Trigger values for which a firm is incentivized to tax evade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the figure 6 we have 2 variables, the tax rate (t) and the probability of being 
caught (λ). The first is represented in the abscissa axis and the second in the ordinates 
axis. The black line represents the points where the trigger 2116 is reached for different 
values of the variables. For example, for a value of 20% tax rate the trigger would be 
achieved if the probability of being caught would be 6,7% (point C), approximately. 
The region above the line of the trigger represents the region where there are no 
incentives to evade part of the cash flows. To understand better how the manager can 
change the decision of evading or not the cash flows we use an example. If we assume 
that the tax rate is 20% and the probability of being caught is 10%, we are in the region 
“No incentives tax evasion” where there are no incentives to tax evasion. But, if the 
probability of being caught changes to 6% the manager will have incentives to evade 
some part of the cash flows. In this last case the intersection will occur in the region of 
“Incentives tax evasion”.  
Also in the figure 6 we can see three represented points: A, B and C. The point 
A represents the situation where the corporate tax rate is 20% and the efficiency of 
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fiscal authorities to detect companies that are engaging in tax evasion activities is 8%, 
this value for the efficiency is the perception the company has about it.We can see that 
in this case the point is in the region of “No incentives to tax evasion”, so the payoff for 
the company with those parameters is not sufficiently good in order to incentivize the 
company to engage in tax evasion. However, if the tax rate of the country is changed by 
the government to 30% we will move to point B or situation B. In that situation we 
observe that we moved to another region, the region of “Incentives to evasion”. Now, 
the firm has incentives to engage in a tax evasion activity because the level of the 
corporate tax rate increased and the trigger value decreased. This happens because the 
gains that the company can now get with the understating of profits are sufficiently high 
to incentivize the company to do that.  
Figure 7 - Impact on the trigger value when the probability of being caught changes. 
 
The figure 7 has the same variables in the axis and the line, but in this case we 
have 3 different triggers. The black line represents the original trigger with the value of 
2116 million euros, the blue represents a trigger with a volatility of 35% and the red 
represents the trigger if the volatility assumed was 15%. As in the first graph, the region 
below the lines is the “tax evasion” region where there are incentives to evade cash 
flows and the region above is the “no tax evasion” region where there are no incentives 
to evade cash flows for the firm. We can conclude by the graph that a higher volatility 
represents a smaller region where there are incentives to tax evasion, but a lower 
volatility leads to a bigger region where the manager is incentivized to evade some cash 
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flows. Once again, we can see that volatility has negative effect in the trigger value. 
This is in line with our results in table 4. That way we can say that the higher the 
uncertainty regarding the cash flows of a firm, the later a firm will have incentives to 
enter the tax evasion stage. In our perspective this is logical because if a manager has 
difficulty to preview the cash flows, it will be harder to make the decision of entering 
the stage of tax evasion or not. Certainty about cash flows will lead to a more precise 
decision because manager will know if the risk of being in an illegal activity could bring 
enough gains to compensate those risks taken. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Tax evasion is a very hot topic in modern finance nowadays. The impact on 
GDP of tax is very high and countries’ economy are very affected by tax evasion. In 
order to control this illegal activity, governments can raise the efficiency of fiscal 
authorities or choose to incentivize firms to tax evade by their policies. For example, 
higher tax rates do not mean higher gains for governments because some firms may opt 
for tax evasion. We study this possibility of firms hiding profits from the government 
and that way pay fewer taxes. 
 
We approach this topic from a different perspective using a real options 
approach and studying the possibility of firms choosing to hide profits in order to pay 
fewer taxes. In the literature there is a gap for the relation between tax evasion and 
firms’ decisions with most of the papers being written about tax evasion on individuals 
and not companies. It was the firm time that tax evasion was linked with firms and real 
options. 
 
Developing a model that incorporates variables that could incentive a manager 
of a firm to opt for hiding some profits, was complex but we did incorporate in our 
model important variables that could lead to that decision or not. This model that we 
developed brings a dynamic setting to the study of tax evasion on firms. The usage of 
real options brought us a different understanding about the dynamics of tax evasion and 
how firms react to differents inputs. Our model has two stages, one where the firms is 
on tax evasion and a second when there is not. It is also assumed that once the firms 
enter the stage where they engange in tax evasion there is no possibility of going to the 
stage with no tax evasion. 
 
This model shows how a process of choosing to hide profits by a firm could be 
and we can see by our analysis using the derivatives or sensitivity analysis that changes 
in variables could incetive managers to tax evade. Beside the part of the firm this can 
also be useful to governments and fiscal authorities once they can see by our model and 
conclusions how firms could react to changes in tax rate, for example.  
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In our main findings we can refer that the increase of taxes will lead to a sooner 
incentive to tax evade by firms or that the more probabibility of getting caught hiding 
profits the later a firm will choose to tax evade, these two conclusions were confirmed 
by our analysis as our intuition also leads us to those conclusions. However, we also 
concluded that the more certain the cash flows are the sooner a manager will have 
incentives to hide profits. In our analysis of the relation between the trigger value and 
the volatility we see that they are negatively related, so the lower the volatitily of cash 
flows the lower the trigger value. The higher the penalty that the firm will have to pay if 
it gets caught engaging in tax evasion, the later the firm will have incentives to enter 
this stage and so it will postpone their decision. We also observe that higher possibility 
of understating profits, i.e., a higher level of understated profits will lead to a lower 
trigger value and sooner the company will have incentives to enter tax evasion stage. 
 
More than mathematical conclusions, our model brings economical conclusions. 
Governements have to make several decisions when fighting tax evasion and when they 
have to collect money from firms or individuals. Taxes are one of the most important 
forms of collecting money by each country. Our model exposes the possibility of 
different tax rates leading to different decisions for firms regarding the choice to enter a 
stage of tax evasion. That way governments may not choose to raise tax rate because 
this will lead to higher incentives for firms to engage in tax evasion and may represent 
fewer returns for the country. As we also can see that higher efficiency of fiscal 
authorities or higher penalties will postpone the incentives of firms to tax evade, 
governments should also invest in those two possibilities in order to reduce tax evasion. 
From a firms’ perspective we can say that there are some cases when the perception of 
the firm is that there are incentives to tax evasion and that the gains from undeclared 
profits compensate the risk of the penalty. Also, we can observe that firms with more 
certain cash flows will have sooner incentives to engage in tax evasion because they 
know with more precision the profit flow for that year.  
 
Our model indicates a timing and value optimal where the managers are 
incentivized to hide profits from the companies and also study the impact of multiple 
variables in that decision. In the end it also estimates the gains for the firms that could 
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be made from paying fewer taxes due to tax evasion, which results in losses for the 
fiscal authorities.  
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